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MILLSON v. LAUGHLIN
and had not in any manner breached a duty to her em-
ployer.
The only other reported case with a factual situation
similar to Ostrofsky was that of Ault v. Unemployment
Compensation Board,26 a lower appellate decision in Penn-
sylvania. There the Pennsylvania court similarly found
misconduct in the employees' refusal to answer their em-
ployer's questions, and connection with the work in the
security requirements of a defense industry.
This writer thinks that the three noted cases delineate
rather clearly in Maryland what connection with the work
is necessary for an employee's wilful misconduct to dis-
qualify him for benefits. While it was unfortunate that
the suitability test was ever brought into the LeCates case,
the two later cases definitely decline to use that test; and
we now know that it will not be adopted in Maryland. The
test is distasteful mainly because of the danger inherent
in it that persons who have worked conscientiously at a
job will be denied unemployment benefits because of some-
thing which had nothing to do with their loyalty to their




Plaintiff and defendant owned and occupied two ad-
jacent lots which had, under a previous owner, been unified
into one tract. During that unity of ownership, a dwelling
house was erected on the portion now owned by defendant.
An electric line was strung to the house from a nearby
road, over an adjacent property, and across the portion of
the tract now owned by plaintiff. A pole, carrying the line
to the house, and holding an electrical transformer was
set up on that portion of the tract. The original owner
sold the northern half of the tract, including the house,
to defendant and in the deed granted defendant use of a
30 foot right of way along the western boundary of the
tract and use in common of an old winding road located
near the same boundary. No mention was made of the
electric line or pole although the usual appurtenance clause
was included in the deed. Defendant obtained title to the
line and pole from the utility company and proceeded to
2188 Pa. Super. 260, 146 A. 2d 729 (1958).
2217 Md. 576, 142 A. 2d 810 (1958).
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repair and maintain them herself. Plaintiff purchased
the southern half of the tract, through mesne conveyances,
and razed a greenhouse previously existing thereon, plan-
ning to build a house on its foundation. He asked defem-
dant's permission to relocate the pole and line, citing his
inability to obtain financing because of the dangerous prox-
imity of the pole and line to the proposed site of his house,
that the humming of the transformer would keep his wife
awake, and that the line passed over the intended location
of his garage. Defendant refused to allow plaintiff to move
the pole or line and the plaintiff sued for a decree declara-
tory of his right to relocate the pole and line and for an
injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the
relocation.
The Circuit Court of Prince Georges County, entered
judgment for the plaintiff and defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Judge Henderson dissenting, held that
though defendant had an easement for the pole and line
across the plaintiff's property, she did not have a right to
insist upon the maintenance of the pole and line in the
exact location previously established and that -plaintiff
could relocate the pole and line without cost to defendant,
so long as the electric line entered the property of the
defendant at the present location and angle. Judge Homey
concurred in the result on the grounds that the defendant
did not have an easement but merely a license, which the
plaintiff could revoke or modify at will.
In reaching the above conclusion the Court took notice
of the general rule that once an easement has been located
upon the servient tenement neither the dominant nor the
servient owner may change its location without a mutual
agreement,2 but refused to apply this doctrine to the facts
of the instant case, distinguishing the cases supporting
the doctrine on the grounds that the easements involved in
those cases were ones of travel and as such involved prob-
lems of grading, drainage, and alignment which were non-
existent in cases such as this under discussion. The Court
indicated that any substantial relocation or change in an
easement of travel would materially effect its use, but
that such was not the case where the easement was of
the nature of an acqueduct or power line.
In holding that the pole could be relocated by the
servient landowner but that the angle and location of entry
of the wires running to the defendant's house could not
2 Ibid., 814, citing 28 C.3.9. 763, § 84; Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md.
132, 12 A. 2d 522 (1940) ; Sibbel v. Fitch, 182 Md. 323, 34 A. 2d 773 (1943).
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be altered, the Court, in effect, adopted the more liberal
view that easements of this type may be expanded or con-
tracted by the servient or dominant landowner along the
original line of the easement, so long as the use and en-
joyment thereof by the dominant owner is not impaired,
and so long as the expenses are absorbed by the person
making the change." This view has been followed in allow-
ing the servient landowner to modify a passageway,4 make
minor alterations to an easement of way,5 make alterations
in the grading of a road,0 repair and alter an acqueduct,'
and even to make a total relocation of a road.' Similarly,
the dominant owner has been allowed to expand the size
of a gas line and meter,' or to relocate a stairway,"° with-
out extinguishing the easement. In each instance it appears
that the modifications were allowed because they were
made for purposes which fell within the original scope of
the easement.
In Frank v. Benesch" the court allowed the owner of
the servient land to make minor changes in the physical
arrangements of a passageway between two houses by
relocating a gate, as long as the changes did not materially
interfere with the dominant owner's use of the easement.
In so holding the court stressed that the dominant owner
was only entitled to the reasonable use of the way for the
purposes for which it was granted.
Like reasoning was used by the New Hampshire Court
in Olcott v. Thompson 2 where the servient landowner was
allowed to improve the appearance of his own property
by replacing the cover to an aqueduct with a more shapely
one but of equal utility. As pointed out by the Court in
the principal case, the Olcott decision was cited by the
court in Tong v. Feldman'8 as authority for the proposition
that the servient owner has a right "to modify an easement
across his property without interfering with the rights of
8 Frank v. Benesch, 74 Md. 58, 21 A. 550 (1891) ; Olcott v. Thompson,
59 N.H. 154 (1884) ; Tong v. Feldman, 152 Md. 398, 136 A. 822 (1927).
'Frank v. Benesch, ibid.
OGreenwalt v. McCardell, 8upra, n. 2.
Sandman v. Highland, 312 Ky. 128, 226 S.W. 2d 766 (1950).
Olcott v. Thompson, aupra, n. 3.
'A.S.D. Securities, Inc. v. J. H. Bellows, 48 Ohio App. 101, 192 N.E.
472 (1933).
9 Tong v. Feldman, supra, n. 3.
10 Sabin v. Rea, 176 Minn. 264, 223 N.W. 151 (1929) ; Thomas v. Mrklonich,
247 Minn. 481, 78 N.W. 2d 386 (1956).
"74 Md. 58, 21 A. 550 (1891).
1259 N.H. 154 (1884).
152 Md. 398, 136 A. 822 (1927).
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the dominant owner.'1 4 Applying a corrollary of this prin-
ciple the court in the Tong case permitted the dominant
owner to enter upon the servient tenement and to increase
the size of a gas pipe and meter which were serving his
premises. Although the owner of the dominant tenement
made the changes so that he would have increased service
for a restaurant he intended to open, it was nonetheless,
found that the change did not exceed the purposes of the
original grant.
In the principal case, the Court, after recognizing the
Tong decision, took the view that if an owner of an ease-
ment can enter the servient land to modify his easement
over the objection of the owner of the fee, it is not unjust
to hold that the fee owner can also modify the easement
to suit his use of the servient land. The Court, thus,
aligned itself with the view of the Olcott and Frank cases
which Tiffany states to be that:
"The owner of the servient tenement may, it seems,
at his own expense, make changes in connection with
the appliances placed thereon for the purpose of ex-
ercising the easement, in so far as such changes in no
way interfere with the exercise of the easement, he
being entitled, except insofar as the exercise of the
easement is conceived, to have his land in condition
satisfactory to himself."' 5
However, it is interesting to note that in an. earlier section
of his treatise Tiffany states that:
"After the point or place at which or line along
which an easement is to be exercised has once been
fixed, whether by express terms of the grant, or by
agreement and acquiescence, one of the parties cannot
change such location without the consent of the
other."'
Judge Henderson, in dissenting in, the principal case,
seems to adopt this view in saying ". . . that the location
of the pole and electric line cannot be altered except by
14 Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 586, 142 A. 2d 810, 815 (1958). In
addition the Court adopted the proposition set forth in Greenwalt v.
McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 136, 12 A. 2d 522 (1940) that:
"Where a right of way Is established by reservation (as 'the court
found to be the situation In the ingtant case), the land remains the
property of the owner of the servient estate, and he is entitled to
use It for any purpose that does not interfere with the easement."
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) 354 § 811.
28Ibid., 334 § 806 [emphasis added].
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agreement of the parties. I find no distinction in the au-
thorities between an easement of travel and an easement
for other purposes, so far as relocation is concerned."' 7
This view has been followed by numerous cases in regard
to attempted relocations of acqueducts, 5 windows,19 ways,2 °
or affecting easements of light2' or the right to take water
from a stream.2 Furthermore, in Guse v. Flohr2' it was
held that the owner of the servient tenement could not
obstruct an easement of way and compel the dominant
owner to use another means of ingress and egress even
though the alternate way was equally convenient.
It is further noted that Tiffany cites the first proposition
in regard to "permissible interferences with easements";
while, the more rigid view, immediately above, is stated
to be the law in regards to "change of location."
The view taken by the Court in the instant case is a
liberalization of that requiring the consent of both parties
before an easement can be relocated. Furthermore, it seems
that the liberalization is based upon a standard of reason-
ableness, as to both the type of easement involved and
the nature of the contemplated change. This view seems to
apply the rules governing permissible interferences with
easements to cases involving the relocation of an easement.
It could be argued that the relocation of the electric pole
was merely a permissible interference, but the Court
chose not to make one distinction along those lines, but
instead made its distinction in the form of the easement
and reasonableness of the contemplated change.
An easement for a way, located as it is upon the surface
of the servient land and affecting the drainage, use and
value of the land, often to a marked degree, would seem
naturally to bear a different relationship to the servient
tenement than lines or pipes providing normal household
utilities. How sharply, and in what specific respects, the
two types of easements differ, one from the other, remains
conjectural although it seems clear that as far as reloca-
tion is concerned, rights of way are not susceptible to a
unilateral, arbitrary movement, while utility services are.
DAVID L. BowEis
7 Supra, n. 14, 595.18Jennison v. Walker, 11 Gray 423 (Mass. 1858).
9Kesseler v. Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N.E. 887 (1916).
21 Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89 S.E. 968 (1916).
2Johnson v. Hahne, 61 N.J. Eq. 438, 49 A. 5 (1901).
2Rhoades v Barnes, 54 Wash. 145, 102 P. 884 (1909).
2 195 Wis. 139, 217 N.W. 730 (1928).
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